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PENNSYLVANIA PROPERTY CASES OF 1961
BY WILLIAM H. DODD*
Assisted by Bernard A. Buzgon, Francis J. Leahey, Jr., Franklin E. Poore, III
PERSONAL PROPERTY
Gifts
In In re Neglia's Estate,1 the decedent, between 1946 and 1952, pur-
chased 13 United States Savings Bonds, Series E. All except the last were
purchased before her marriage. Eight of the bonds were issued in the name
of decedent or her brother. Four were issued in the name of decedent POD
(payable on death) to her brother. The last bond was issued in decedent's
married name POD to her brother. During October 1957, the decedent,
intending to make a gift to her husband, endorsed and delivered possession
of the bonds to her husband. After decedent's death, the bank refused to
cash the 13 bonds mentioned above because there had been no compliance
with the treasury regulations for transfer and reissuance of bonds.
In a proceeding for a declaratory judgment brought by the personal
representative of the decedent's estate, the court was of the opinion that the
decedent's husband, the alleged donee, was entitled to the proceeds of the
bonds as against the designated co-owner, the brother of the decedent. The
court, consistent with In re Cochran's (Horstinan) Estate,2 stated that the
treasury regulations merely made the designated co-owner a third party
beneficiary under the contract between the purchaser of the bonds and the
United States Government. All that these regulations require is that pay-
ment must be made to such bond-designated co-owner as he is recognized
as the sole and absolute owner of such bonds. The impact of the regulations
terminates when such payment is made. Subsequently, the court may direct
payment of the proceeds to one who is, under state law, equitably entitled to
such proceeds.
Stemniski v. Stemniski 3 presented the question of whether U.S. Govern-
ment Series E Bonds issued in the names of husband "or" wife could be held
as tenants by the entireties. The court said the treasury regulation stating that
* Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law; B.A., Dickinson College; LL.B.,
Dickinson School of Law.
1. 403 Pa. 464, 170 A.2d 357 (1961). See note, 66 DICK. L. REv. 233 (1962).
2. 398 Pa. 506, 159 A.2d 514 (1960).
3. 403 Pa. 38, 169 A.2d 51 (1961).
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upon payment to either co-owner, the other co-owner shall cease to have any
interest in the bond,4 was merely to protect the government and not to control
the relationship existing between the co-owners. The regulations are silent on
the right of either to possession in a contest. This case is, therefore, con-
sistent with In re Neglia's Estate5 in asserting that the regulations were for
the protection of the government.
The court ruled that the bonds were held as tenants by the entireties
because the unities of interest, title, time, and possession were present. Since
the bonds were in the names of husband "or" wife, either party could cash
the securities and receive the proceeds if done in good faith and for the
mutual benefit of both. If otherwise, the other co-owner, consistent with the
Pennsylvania law of tenancies by the entireties in bank accounts, may sue
for an accounting and division.
In re Berdar's Estate" involved the determination of title to a joint sav-
ings account in a savings and loan association. The decedent had signed a
signature card which stated that the account should be in the joint names of
Berdar (decedent) and Malutinok (claimant) "as joint tenants with right
of survivorship, and not as tenants in common." This, said the court, creates
only a prima facie case of an inter vivos gift, and other evidence is admissible
to establish the lack of donative intent. The alleged donor was of foreign
extraction and did not completely comprehend the English language. Thus,
extrinsic evidence was admitted to prove that decedent's creation of the
account was solely for his own convenience and not a means for transferring
ownership of the account before or after his death. This evidence was held
to be sufficiently clear, precise and convincing to overcome the prima facie
case of the existence of donative intent established by the signature card.
In In re Parkhurst's Estate7 an uncle had purchased shares of corporate
stocks in 1941 and had them registered in his name and that of his niece "as
joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not as tenants in common."
About a year after he received the certificates he rented a safe deposit box
at a bank in his own name and placed the certificates in it. A week later he
had the box registered in the joint names of himself and his niece "with either
having full rights of entry therein without the presence of the other." The
niece entered the box alone on two occasions; the uncle, once. Then the box
was surrendered, and the niece delivered the securities in question to the
bank and received a receipt stating, "for account of W. P. Parkhurst (uncle)
-safekeeping." In 1950 some stocks were sold by the bank on the uncle's
written order and the niece's written consent. Other shares were purchased,
4. 31 C.F.R. 313.60(a) (1959).
5. Supra note 1.
6. 404 Pa. 93, 170 A.2d 861 (1961).
7. 402 Pa. 527, 167 A.2d 476 (1961).
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registered in the same manner, and placed in the uncle's safe-keeping account
at the bank. Share certificates issued when some stocks were split were in
the names of the uncle and niece jointly and were kept by the bank in the
uncle's safe-keeping account. Dividends during the uncle's lifetime were
deposited by the bank to the credit of the uncle's checking account. Stock
powers or assignments in blank, executed by the uncle and niece, accompanied
the certificates. After the uncle's death in 1956 the niece's claim to this
stock was resisted by the uncle's administrator. These facts were agreed
upon in a stipulation by counsel. The supreme court, one member dissent-
ing, held that by the registration in the joint names and the deposit in a
jointly held safe deposit box, to which the niece had exercised the right of
access, the uncle had manifested the intent to make an inter vivos gift to
the niece and had made such delivery as was consonant with the creation of
a joint interest in the stock. By not making claim to dividends during the
uncle's lifetime the niece had waived her rights to such dividends.
8
Miscellaneous
In re Feitz' Estate9 overruled, in part, Ryan Estate."' The court agreed
with the basic propositions espoused in Ryan that (1) no person has a con-
stitutional right to a liquor license and (2) a liquor license, being a personal
privilege and not a property right, is not an asset of the deceased holder.
The tribunal, however, went on to state that when the decedent, by will,
devises to another the right to apply for a transfer of such license, the value
of the right is an asset of the decedent's estate. As such it is subject to
taxation for inheritance tax purposes. To the extent that Ryan was in con-
flict with this latter proposition, Ryan was overruled.
Justice Bell vehemently dissented. Pointing out that the statute (the
Liquor Control Act) gives the Liquor Control Board the right in its sole dis-
cretion to transfer or not to transfer the license "if, as and when it desires,"
he concluded that the value of the opportunity to have the Board exercise its
discretion at the death of the licensee could be ascertained only by a "wild
guess." Since the liquor license is concededly a personal privilege which
terminates at decedent's death, at which time the right to apply for a trans-
fer comes into being, he questioned whether the latter can properly be con-
sidered something transferred by will of which the decedent died "seized or
possessed" within the language of the inheritance tax law. Section 102(17)
of the Inheritance and Estate Tax Act of 1961,"1 effective Jan. 1, 1962, pro-
vides that "property" or "estate" includes: (v) A liquor license issued by the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
8. See annotation, Fid. Rev., March, 1961, p. 1.
9. 402 Pa. 437, 167 A.2d 504 (1961).
10. 375 Pa. 42, 99 A.2d 562 (1953).
11. Pa. Laws 1961, act 207, § 102(17) (v).
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Gilbertson Coal Co. v. Schuster,12 involved an appeal from an order in
the court below refusing to strike from the record a judgment, entered under
a warrant of attorney, in an amicable action of ejectment. The record dis-
closed that the judgment plaintiff entered into a written agreement with the
City of Philadelphia (trustee of Girard Estate) wherein the plaintiff, for a
consideration, was permitted to carry away materials contained in certain
refuse banks in Schuylkill County. The refuse, or culm, was the remnant of
the initial processing of coal.
Subsequently, the plaintiff entered into a written agreement with the
defendant whereby the latter was to, among other things, clean, wash, and
process the coal. The coal was then to be delivered to plaintiff for sale. The
contract contained a warrant of attorney empowering an attorney to sign
an agreement for the entry of an amicable action and confession of judgment
in ejectment against the defendant. Following a breach of the agreement
by defendant an amicable action and confession of judgment was entered of
record against the defendant. The legality of this judgment is now being
questioned.
The court's basic premise was that in an action of ejectment titles to
corporeal hereditaments only are adjudicated. It lies to gain possession of
real property. The grant from the trustee gave plaintiff a mere license, which
is not a possessory interest in land. The culm banks were personal property
and the license to remove and carry away personal property is not a corporeal
hereditament. Therefore, plaintiff did not have such a possessory interest in
land as would entitle him to bring an action of ejectment.
BERNARD A. BUZGON
FUTURE INTERESTS
Testator's will in In Re Heaton's Estate1' gave his residuary estate in
trust, the income of which was to be divided into two parts, half to testator's
son and half to his daughter. After the son's death, his half of the income
was to be divided equally among his three sons (named) and at the daughter's
death, her share of the income was to be paid to her son (named). The will
further provided that at the death of each grandchild leaving issue, the share
of principal of which such grandchild was receiving income should be paid
to such grandchild's children or issue per stirpes. In the event that any
grandchild should die without issue, the principal of the share of which such
grandchild was receiving income was "to continue and thus augment the
shares of his or her brothers and sisters. . . ." If a grandchild should die
without issue or brothers and sisters, the share of such grandchild was to be
12. 403 Pa. 226, 169 A.2d 44 (1961).
13. 404 Pa. 360, 172 A.2d 293 (1961).
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paid "to the persons who would be entitled thereto as my heirs and next of
kin respectively under the intestate laws of the State of Pennsylvania in force
at the time of this writing." (Court's emphasis.)
Only one of testator's son's three children died with issue surviving
(Harry, who died in 1933, leaving three children). (Augustus died in 1936;
Perry died in 1954.) Upon Perry's death, Harry's three children received the
principal of one-half of testator's trust estate outright. Testator's daughter's
son died testate and without issue in 1958 (being the last surviving grand-
child).
Harry's three children (appellants) and the residuary legatee of testa-
tor's daughter's son (appellee) each claimed the one-half share of principal,
the income of which was received by the daughter's son during his life.
Appellants asserted that since the last surviving grandchild died without issue
that this share of the principal should be paid to testator's heirs, to be deter-
mined as of the date of death of the said grandchild. Appellee contended,
and the supreme court so found, that "heirs and next of kin respectively
under the intestate laws of the State of Pennsylvania in force at the time of
this writing" meant that the share of the principal in question "should be
paid to the heirs and next of kin of the testator who were to be determined
as of the date that testator wrote his will." (Emphasis added.) The court
noted that the rule of construction in force in 1900, the year of testator's death,
was that a legacy to testator's next of kin meant such persons determined as
of the date of his death even though preceded by a life estate.
The "heirs and next of kin" of testator at the time he wrote his will
and at his death were his son and daughter. It was consequently decreed
that the principal of which the last surviving grandchild was receiving income
had devolved one-half to the son's heirs or legatees and one-half to the
daughter's heirs or legatees (the appellee thereby being entitled to one-fourth
of testator's entire residuary trust estate).
In In Re Tripp's Estate,14 the testator, who died in 1898, devised a
tract of land to his son for life unless "he shall have issue born to him capable
of inheriting the same, and in that event the life estate in the land shall be-
come an absolute in fee." The will further provided if testator's son should
die without issue or descendants of issue that the land given him would "be-
come a part of my residuary estate, and go to my children to whom the same
is given, and in that event, my said residuary heirs shall pay the wife of my
son, if she still survives, the sum of three thousand dollars." The residuary
clause read, "I give, devise and bequeath to my heirs .. .all the rest and
residue of my estate ... the child or children of any deceased child to receive
the share of their respective parents." Appellant claimed through the husband
14. 402 Pa. 211, 166 A.2d 619 (1961).
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of testator's daughter, who died in 1919 without issue surviving her. Testa-
tor's son died in 1957 without ever having had issue born to him. Appellant
contended that the remainder interest in the land vested in the testator's
children at the date of his (testator's) death subject to being divested should
issue be born to testator's son. He cited the general rule of construction
which favored a remainder vested rather than contingent, if possible. The
supreme court affirmed the lower court's holding that the language gave the
remainder to the class designated as testator's "heirs," meaning his children
or their issue, who were to be ascertained at the date of death of the testa-
tor's son, the life tenant.
Testator's will in In Re Dinkey's Estate,15 created a testamentary trust,
the net revenue of which was to be used to pay each of his three named chil-
dren 400 dollars per month with the balance payable to his wife for life. The
will further provided, "Upon the death of my said wife . . . I direct the
surviving trustee to divide the trust estate into three equal portions, and to
pay the same to my three children . . . .In case of the death of any of my
children prior to the distribution of the trust estate ... I direct that his or
her share be paid to his or her surviving children, and if any child shall die
without issue surviving his or her share shall be divided equally among my
surviving children, or their children, such children together taking a parent's
share."
One of testator's sons died childless six years before the life beneficiary,
leaving a widow who claimed one-third of the principal of the trust on the
theory that the will had given each of testator's three children, including her
husband, a remainder interest which vested at the death of the testator. It
was argued that the provisions concerning payments to be made in the event
of the death of any of the children prior to the distribution of the trust estate
referred only to payments of the 400 dollars per month income and did not
alter the vested character of the gift of the corpus. The supreme court affirmed
the lower court's conclusion that the latter language referred to the principal,
and only those children of the testator who survived the testator's widow,
or the then surviving children, per stirpes, of deceased children, were entitled.
The question in In re Johnson's Estate16 was whether a proper case had
been presented for the issuance of a declaratory judgment by the orphans'
court. Petitioner was the personal representative of a decedent who had
been bequeathed one-fourth of the remainder of a residuary trust which was
to terminate upon the death of the last survivor of two successive life bene-
ficiaries. The trustee was directed to pay the specified share of the corpus to
the named legatee "if she shall be living at the time of the distribution of
15. 403 Pa. 179, 168 A.2d 337 (1961).
16. 403 Pa. 476, 171 A.2d 518 (1961).
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my residuary estate." One life tenant died in 1955, the other was still living;
the decedent died in 1957. Petitioner sought a declaratory judgment that
this language created a vested remainder in his decedent upon her surviving
the time the residuary estate was distributed to the trustee in 1951.
The supreme court held that the personal representative was entitled
to a declaratory judgment on the question whether his decedent took a vested
or contingent remainder in spite of the fact that upon the death of the other
life tenant the question could be determined at the audit of the trustee's
account in the orphans' court at the termination of the trust. The lower
court's denial of the remedy was held to be an abuse of discretion.
In Re Little's Estate17 and In Re Scholler's Estate8 both involved the
question whether a valid charitable trust had been created. In the former the
residuary clause in testator's will provided: "The balance of my estate ...
is to be deposited ... in a fund. From this fund there must be a suitable
memorial for my saintly brother (named) and my wonderful parents
(named). I entreat my executors to seek advise [sic] from my good friend
(named) as to the nature of the memorials. However I do not want this
money to be governed or used by social workers in any manner whatso-
ever . . . ." There was no language in the clause imposing specific duties
on the trustees or enumerating the specific uses to be made of the funds.
The testator's heirs contended that because of this the trust was a dry trust
which failed, thereby causing the testator to die intestate as to his residuary
estate. The supreme court affirmed the lower court's decree recognizing that
by the language contained in the residuary clause and the will in its entirety,
plus the circumstances attending the execution of his will, testator had created
a charitable trust for such uses as his trustees should determine would pro-
vide suitable memorials to his deceased parents and brother. Two justices
dissented.
In In re Scholler's Estate, the settlor of an expressly irrevocable and
unamendable inter vivos trust established, in his words, "a charitable trust
to be known as The Scholler Foundation." However, after reciting various
general charitable purposes the terms of the trust originally provided that
it was "specifically" for the purpose of providing hospitalization, medical
care, and educational, literary and recreational facilities for employees of
named corporations of which for practical purposes the settlor was the sole
shareholder. These provisions were subsequently deleted through amendment
by the settlor and the trustee upon their learning that because of them the
trust might not constitute a tax exempt charity under the laws of Canada.
The heirs of the settlor upon his death contended that the deleted provisions
17. 403 Pa. 247, 168 A.2d 738 (1961).
18. 403 Pa. 97, 169 A.2d 554 (1961).
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nullified the charitable nature of the trust and that, such being the case, the
rule against perpetuities was violated. Affirming on the opinion of the lower
court, the supreme court held that the trust was charitable and hence not
subject to the rule against perpetuities. In so holding, the court determined
that the settlor's provision for the employees was subsidiary to his overall
charitable intent and would not affect the charitable nature of the trust
because of a severability clause. The deed of trust by its terms was irrevo-
cable and unamendable. However, the settlor and trustee deleted the question-
able provisions by subsequent amendment. This was held by the court to be
effective to reform the instrument on the basis that the settlor, in including
a provision contrary to his intent, made a unilateral mistake. The Attorney
General, counsel for the trustee-appellees, had made no objection to the
reformation of the trust deed on behalf of the beneficiaries.
In Catherwood Trust,19 the supreme court, overruling three prior cases,
held that the Principal and Income Act of 1947 may constitutionally be
applied to trusts created prior to its passage. Recognizing that the effect of
its decision was to abolish prospectively the Pennsylvania rule of apportion-
ment, the court stated, "The legislative enactment did not modify or ex-
tinguish any vested property rights. There is no vested property right in
a court-made rule of apportionment.
' 20
In Re Ryan's Estate2 1 involved an application by a life beneficiary of a
spendthrift trust under Section 2 of the Estates Act of 194722 for an allow-
ance from principal to supplement the income received from the trust which
had become inadequate to cover his living expenses. Affirming on the opinion
of the lower court, the supreme court upheld the order entered under the
above mentioned section allowing the widower of testatrix a monthly payment
from principal of 100 dollars in addition to medical, nursing and hospital
expenses reasonably necessary for his comfort. All parties in interest did not
agree to the invasion, for which the terms of the trust made no provision.
However, the court noted that the statute did not require the consent of all
interested parties so long as they had received notice of the application.
FRANCIS J. LEAHEY, JR.
EMINENT DOMAIN
In Wolf v. Commonwealth,23 the supreme court held that "just com-
pensation" as provided for by the constitution of Pennsylvania 24 in eminent
19. 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961).
20. See Fid. Rev., Aug. 1961, p. 1; Fid. Rev., Sept. 1961, p. 1; Fid. Rev., Oct. 1961,
p. 4.
21. 404 Pa. 229, 172 A.2d 584 (1961).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.2 (1950).
23. 403 Pa. 499, 170 A.2d 557 (1961).
24. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 10 (1874).
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domain proceedings requires that the Commonwealth, like other condemnors,
pay interest on the award from the date thereof until the time of payment.
Thus, the Commonwealth lost its favored position of immunity as announced
in Culver v. Commonwealth,25 now overruled. The court, in considering
whether the condemnee was the cause of the delay, hence working a forfeiture
of the detention damages, ruled that the landowner's expert's valuation
totaling 400,000 dollars in excess of the Commonwealth's was not binding on
the property owner. The fault thus did not lie with the plaintiff. The court
noted that the judgment n.o.v. (entered three months subsequent to the jury
award) properly included detention damages on the jury award from the
time of taking of the property through to the date of such judgment. Upon
this amount, stated the court, "interest should run until the date of final
payment thereof by the Commonwealth. .. ."
In Earl M. Kerstetter, Inc. v. Commonwealth,26 it was held that the
lower court erred by admitting into evidence the original and revised plans of
appellant's subdivision, thereby allowing the jury to know the difference in
the number of lots before and after condemnation, and then permitting con-
demnee's president to testify as to the selling prices of homes on nearby land.
The reason assigned for so ruling was that the property should be valued
as a tract and not by taking into consideration the number of lots into which
the property might be divided and the residential worth of each lot separately.
Allowing testimony as to the cost of a particular type of fencing along the
right of way was also held to constitute error. However, the fact that fencing
was necessary in order to use the remaining land would have been competent
evidence.
McArthur v. Township of Mount Lebanon2 7 involved the construction
of a provision of the First Class Township Code28 permitting a complaint
which questions the legality of any township ordinance or resolution, if filed
within 30 days after such becomes effective, to be made to the court of quarter
sessions, its determination and order to be deemed conclusive. The purpose
of the provision, as the court viewed it, was to provide a fast and efficient
method whereby to question the procedure surrounding the adoption of an
ordinance, and was not designed to prevent later appeals involving the con-
stitutional application of the ordinance after the 30 day period. Hence, the
court of quarter sessions was without power to decide that the township
lacked statutory authority in enacting an ordinance condemning part of
plaintiff's land for a walkway.
25. 348 Pa. 472, 35 A.2d 64 (1944).
26. 404 Pa. 168, 172 A.2d 163 (1961).
27. 402 Pa. 78, 165 A.2d 630 (1960).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 56502 (1959).
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In In Re Condemnation of Certain Interests in Lands of Lenik,29 a right
of way 700 feet long and 150 feet wide, with trimming rights over 50 foot
strips on either side, was condemned by a power company for its power lines.
The record revealed that the valuations of damages by the landowner and
his expert were twice that of the condemnors because of a mistaken belief
that the use of the 250 foot strip as a nursery had been terminated. The
jury's verdict for an amount in excess of all the experts' assessments and
only a little lower than the amount claimed by the owner was held to be
against the weight of credible evidence.
In Recht v. Urban Redevelopment Authority,30 the question presented
was whether an attorney could assert an equitable charging lien against a
judgment recovered after a jury's verdict in a trial de novo on the client's
appeal from a viewers' award in a condemnation proceeding. The attorney
took no part in the preparation or trial of the appeal, and there was no
agreement that he would look to the fund recovered by the client for his fee.
However, he had represented the condemnee before the board of viewers
which awarded the client a sum amounting to slightly more than half the
jury's verdict on appeal. The supreme court reversed the superior court,
indicating that it was error to consider the viewers' proceeding and the trial
on appeal as one proceeding producing the "fund." Even though the viewers'
proceeding was a prerequisite to the award secured on appeal, 31 the deter-
mination in the viewers' proceeding was extinguished as a result of the appeal.
In Griggs v. County of Allegheny3 2 plaintiff petitioned for appointment
of viewers to assess damages against the county for its alleged taking of his
land. Since 1952 the county had owned and operated an airport. Aircraft
of various air lines in taking off or landing at the airport flew over part of
plaintiff's 19-acre residential tract at less than 500 feet, the lowest limit of
navigable air space at the time. The proximity of the aircraft, their noise
and lights, substantially interfered with plaintiff's use of the land. The
county excepted to the viewers' award of damages to the plaintiff, from which
the plaintiff himself had appealed, on the ground that the viewers' findings
of fact failed to show there had been a taking of plaintiff's property by the
county. The supreme court reversed the order of the lower court dismissing
these exceptions, two members dissenting. The majority said the record
failed to show that the county was the cause of the flights over plaintiff's
land below the navigable air space since there was no proof that the county
owned, operated or controlled the aircraft involved. Also the county's drafting
and submitting a "Master Plan" to the CAA for approval, which showed an
29. 404 Pa. 257, 172 A.2d 316 (1961).
30. 402 Pa. 599, 168 A.2d 134 (1961).
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 37842 (1951).
32. 402 Pa. 411, 168 A.2d 153 (1961). See Note, 66 DICK. L. REv. 107 (1961).
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"approach area" for a runway over petitioner's land, did not give the county
an easement or deprive plaintiff of any use of his property. The majority
suggested that plaintiff should resort to an action against the owners or
operators of the aircraft involved in the flights which were interfering with
plaintiff's use of his land.
ZONING
Constitutionality and Construction of Zoning Ordinances
In Lally Zoning Case,33 the lower court's order affirming the denial by
the Board of Zoning Adjustment of an application for a variance to use a
triangular-shaped property located in an "A-Residential" district for an
auto-repair shop was upheld by the supreme court. Although there were
some commercial uses and a cemetery nearby, the court upheld the validity of
the ordinance and said that the enforcement of the residential use as to
appellant's property was not unreasonable or confiscatory. The court pointed
out that there must be lines of demarcation between zones, and this is a
matter within the power of the municipal authority, the exercise of which
will not be interfered with by the courts unless the classification bears no
substantial relationship to the police power objectives.
The Sun Oil Company, equitable owner of a tract of land fronting 151
feet on a main traffic artery, contended, in Sun Oil Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Ad-
justment,3 4 that a provision in the zoning ordinance requiring that vehicular
"access points" be limited, wherever possible, to intervals of not less than
300 feet on major thoroughfares was unconstitutional. It was argued that
the restriction was vague, bore no reasonable relation to public safety or
general welfare, and was confiscatory in that a larger land investment would
be required, in providing the minimum distance between access points, than
was economically feasible. The supreme court upheld both the ordinance and
the Board's refusal to issue a building and occupancy permit (the latter's
ruling having been based on the Planning Commission's disapproval of the
oil company's site plan). In so deciding, the court held that the regulation
was substantially related to public safety on major traffic arteries since con-
tributing to the maintenance of a continuous flow of traffic and the prevention
of vehicular collisions. The provision concerning "access points" authorized
the Commission, in considering site plans, to endeavor to assure safety and
orderly traffic movement both within the site and in relation to access streets,
and to secure the beneficial relationship of structures and uses on the site.
This was held to be a constitutionally valid delegation of legislative power
because sufficient standards were provided to control determinations of the
Commission.
33. 404 Pa. 174, 171 A.2d 161 (1961).
34. 403 Pa. 409, 169 A.2d 294 (1961).
1962]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
In Puno v. Norristown Borough,3 5 the supreme court upheld a borough
zoning ordinance amendment converting an area from "residential" to
"secondary business" so as to allow additional acreage for expansion of an
existing shopping center. The challenging owners contended that due process
was lacking because the personal notice required by the zoning ordinance
was not given to interested parties in the area affected, and also, that the
borough's action amounted to "spot zoning." The latter contention failed,
according to the court, because the amendment added acreage to an already
established "secondary business" area which, like other areas of this kind, "fol-
lowed main traffic arteries," thus demonstrating the existence of a compre-
hensive plan. The former contention was dismissed since notice of the hear-
ing as published in the local newspaper was in conformity with the enabling
act. The notice provisions of the borough zoning ordinance were merely
directory, and failure to comply therewith did not invalidate the amendment.
In Mignatti Appeal3 the court concluded that the lower court erred
when it construed the provisions in an ordinance prohibiting "asphalt manu-
facture or refining" as referring only to the process of refining crude petro-
leum to produce asphalt. This, said the court, may be the technical mean-
ing of "asphalt," but the ordinance embodied also the common meaning of
the word, and thus prohibited the making of bituminous concrete for use in
the construction of "asphalt" roads.
Amending Zoning Ordinance After Issuance of Building Permit
In Hyde v. Pittsburgh Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,3 7 permittee (a corpo-
ration), intending to make improvements for commercial use, bought land
in 1954 and 1956 in an area where numerous commercial uses existed under
prior zoning classifications. It secured a building permit in 1957, the issuance
of which was appealed by adjoining landowners through the Board to the
county court wherein no further action was taken. Several contracts were
made and work was done under the permit before the area was re-classified
residential in 1958. Subsequently, a subordinate inspector revoked the permit,
but it was later reinstated by the superintendent of the Bureau of Building
Inspection. The adjoining landowners appealed the reinstatement to the
Board of Adjustment and then to the county court, both of which affirmed
the action of the superintendent. In affirming the lower court, the supreme
court held that the evidence sustained the findings that the permittee had met
the nonconforming use requirements of "substantial construction," "sub-
stantial establishment," or "contract for construction let" contained in the
new ordinance. The court also noted that, though the appellant's prior appeal
35. 404 Pa. 475, 172 A.2d 828 (1961).
36. 403 Pa. 144, 168 A.2d 567 (1961).
37. 403 Pa. 415, 169 A.2d 547 (1961).
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to the county court of the issuance of the original permit forced permittee to
proceed with construction at his own risk, appellant's unnecessary delay in
prosecuting or withdrawing that appeal was "clearly not conducive to the
fair and equitable administration of building and zoning laws and is to be
condemned."
Variances
In Joseph B. Simon & Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,3 8 Justice Bell
(now Chief Justice) enunciated the time honored formula and policy con-
siderations used by the supreme court in testing factual situations surrounding
applications for variances, when he said:
In order to establish a right to a variance an applicant must
prove (1) unnecessary hhrdship upon and which is unique or
peculiar to the applicant's property, as distinguished from the hard-
ship arising from the impact of the Zoning Act or regulations on the
entire district; and (2) that the proposed variance is not contrary
to the public safety, health, morals or general welfare ...
In many zoning cases there is considerable merit on the side
of both the applicant, who is generally desirous of developing a
community or a piece of ground or a building to meet the needs
and the progress of our increasing and expanding population, and
the protestants, who generally speaking wish their respective prop-
erties or their community to retain its old residential or neighbor-
hood character.
It must be apparent to anyone who gives thoughtful consider-
ation to these vexing problems (a) that the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania is not, should not be and, realistically speaking, cannot be
a super Board of Adjustment; (b) that we must allow the Board
of Adjustment and/or the lower Court wide discretion in zoning
matters; and (c) we should reverse only for a clear abuse of dis-
cretion or an error of law.
In this case the supreme court affirmed the order of the court below uphold-
ing the Board's refusal of a variance to permit premises zoned "D" Resi-
dential to be used for a gasoline station. The Board did not abuse its dis-
cretion or commit an error of law and the requisite hardship was not
established where appellant bought the triangular-shaped land with knowl-
edge of the zoning restrictions and where testimony before the Board as to
its suitability for residential use was conflicting.
The supreme court also refused variances in the following cases:
(1) In Magrann v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,3 9 the court affirmed
the lower court's determination that the Board had abused its discretion in
granting a variance allowing premises zoned "D-Residential" to be used
38. 403 Pa. 176, 168 A.2d 317 (1961).
39. 404 Pa. 198, 170 A.2d 553 (1961).
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for a gasoline station, where the only evidence in support of the variance was
that appellant would suffer economic hardship if the variance was not granted.
The essence of appellant's contention was that though his land was suitable
for the erection of conforming residences, the requested variance should be
granted in order to enhance the value of his lot, notwithstanding the fact
that such use might depreciate the value of neighboring properties.
(2) In Lally Zoning Case,40 the court, in reply to the owner's con-
tention that the unusual triangular shape of the lot prevented the permitted
use, observed that the evidence showed that construction of a dwelling satisfy-
ing all zoning requirements was feasible and that the hardship, if any, was
self-inflicted. Apparently, the shape of the property was conceived to provide
frontage for the commercial use desired, at a minimum expenditure, in dis-
regard of the zoning regulations.
(3) In Heller v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,41 the supreme court
affirmed the order of the court below which upheld the Board's refusal of a
building permit to add another apartment to a building converted from a
single-family to a nine-apartment structure under a variance from the side
yard requirements which had been granted in 1959. Appellant contended
that the addition merely required a permit, on the theory of a continuing
right to the variance since no external change, decreasing the size of the
yard, was involved. Justice Bok pointed out that the application was properly
treated as involving a new request for a variance, the denial of which was
proper on the following grounds: (a) the record supported the finding that
the granting of the permit would adversely affect the health, morals, safety
and general welfare of the neighborhood, and (b) the earlier variance for
conversion to a nine-apartment structure did not require issuance of a permit
for an additional apartment since there was no identity between rights to
operate nine-family and ten-family establishments.
Special Exceptions
Justice Cohen said of special exceptions in Blair v. Bd. of Adjustment :42
A special exception is issued for an exceptional use which may
be permitted within a particular district if the board of adjustment
determines its availability. Such uses are made available as a
privilege, not as of right, assuming that the requisite facts and con-
ditions detailed in the ordinance are found to exist . . . . Since its
allowance is predicated on the exercise of prudent discretion by
the Board, only a manifest abuse of that discretion will cause
reversal on appeal. (Court's emphasis.)
This appeal concerned the refusal of the Board to grant special exceptions to
40. Supra note 1.
41. 404 Pa. 8, 171 A.2d 44 (1961).
42. 403 Pa. 105, 169 A.2d 49 (1961).
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two property owners who intended to use their properties for the operation
of gasoline stations in a district zoned for retail business. If the exceptions
had been allowed, five service stations would have been located within a
radius of 350 feet. The supreme court upheld the Board, reversed the
lower court, and held that the Board had not abused its discretion in refus-
ing the special exceptions, where the refusal was based on the anticipation
of abnormal traffic patterns creating danger and congestion in the retail
zone, considerations of the effect of the proposal on the "character of the
neighborhood," conservation of the value of existing buildings, and the
encouragement of "the most appropriate use of the land" as required by the
ordinance.
In Upper Providence Township Appeal,48 the applicant sought a special
exception to operate a club in an "Agricultural-Residential" zone under a
provision allowing non-commercial clubs, providing services for members
and guests only, upon approval of the Board of Adjustment. There were no
sanitation facilities for members and no plan for adequate, all-weather park-
ing facilities as specified by ordinance. Access to the premises was gained
by a dirt road (apparently private) in violation of the ordinance requirement
that all lots abut a public street for at least fifty feet. Certain members of
the club made a modest profit (e.g., $26.25 for twenty-nine hours work)
from the sale of food, and the informal plan submitted by the club did not
meet the ordinance requirement of a "plan drawn to scale." The Board's
refusal of the special exception was held not to be an abuse of discretion
and its action was affirmed.
In Gage Zoning Case,4 4 the supreme court affirmed the lower court's
order which reversed the Board of Adjustment's refusal to grant a special
exception for a convalescent home in a predominantly residential municipality.
Justice Musmanno, expressing the opinion of the court, wrote:
The appellant contends that one of the objectives of the Zoning
Ordinance was to conserve the value of the existing properties in
the Township. We do not so read the ordinance, but if it could be
shown that in some degree a ... house in the immediate vicinity ...
would now sell for less because of the convalescent home's prox-
imity, we would still say that that would not be an adequate reason
for prohibiting the use . ...
The Board's action in refusing the exception was erroneous because it mis-
apprehended the purpose of an exception when it also based its refusal on a
finding that appellee had not expended enough effort to find a purchaser
desirous of using the property as a private residence, since a showing of
unnecessary hardship is not a prerequisite to the obtaining of an exception.
43. 403 Pa. 50, 169 A.2d 47 (1961).
44. 402 Pa. 244, 167 A.2d 292 (1961).
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Certificates of Use or Occupancy
The Zoning Board's denial of an application for a certificate which
would have allowed the remaining portion of the land upon which a gasoline
station was situated to be used for the sale, rental, and storage of automobiles
and trailers, and as an open parking lot, was affirmed by the supreme court
in Suhy v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment.45 The land, zoned "A" Commercial,
was not in the center of the commercial area but was a corner property which
fronted residences on three sides. The court felt that the increased activity
would result in more racket, dust, smells, and traffic hazards affecting the
health, safety, and welfare of nearby homeowners.
In Haas v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,46 the Board granted two certif-
icates-one to permit a 158-bed convalescent home and the other for use
of part of the land as a parking lot. The area was zoned "A" Residential
and could be used for a convalescent home by the terms of the ordinance,
provided a zoning certificate was obtained. The order of the lower court
sustaining the issuance of the certificate was affirmed on the basis that a
convalescent home would not per se have an adverse effect upon the health,
safety or welfare of the protesting neighbors, nor was there evidence that
the proposed use would in fact have that effect.
Nonconforming Uses
In Mignatti Appeal4 7 the supreme court approved the Zoning Board of
Adjustment's refusal to grant a special exception to allow appellees to erect
and operate a bituminous concrete mixing plant at their quarry and stone-
crushing plant, which was a nonconforming use in an area having the highest
residential classification. The court said this was not merely accessory to, or
a reasonable expansion of, the existing use. It was a use different in kind,
rather than degree, and involved independent operations severable from the
industry of quarrying and crushing stone. The lower court, relying on its
decision in a prior unappealed case that production of bituminous concrete
was an accessory use,48 had reversed the Board.
The evidence before the Board in Stokes v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment4
was that ten years before an ordinance was enacted which located the property
in a "C" Residential district, appellant bought the property and used it for
storage of horses, wagons, and contractors' equipment. A blacksmith shop
45. 402 Pa. 657, 169 A.2d 62 (1961).
46. 403 Pa. 155, 169 A.2d 287 (1961).
47. Supra note 4.
48. M. & M. Stone Co. v. Lower Salford Township Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
16 Pa. D.&.C.2d 584 (1958), which relied on Cheswick Borough v. Bechman, 352 Pa.
79, 42 A.2d 60 (1945), was distinguished by the court, from the present facts, because
the installation of a rotary screen to sift sand and loam extracted from the quarry in
that case would have resulted in a true accessory use.
49. 402 Pa. 508. 167 A.2d 316 (1961).
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was built on the premises, but the testimony conflicted as to whether this
was before the enactment of the ordinance and as to whether, in addition
to the shoeing of horses and the repair of equipment kept on the premises,
the general public was served. Eighteen years after the enactment of the
ordinance the building burned, was later rebuilt, and machinery for the repair
of tractor treads and heavy earth-moving equipment moved in. The supreme
court ruled that the evidence sustained the finding of the Board that the
original blacksmith shop was a use accessory to the business of storing and
leasing contractors' equipment. Therefore, appellant was not entitled to a
permit for a shop to repair contractors' equipment because an accessory use
cannot be the basis for the establishment of a nonconforming principal use.
The question involved in Eitnier v. Kreitz Corp.50 was whether an
existing nonconforming use (trucking terminal) could be continued, where
the continuance would result in construction of a new building partially
enclosing the place where the prior use had been carried on in the open air.
The supreme court held that the Board had not abused its discretion in
granting a permit for such construction, although the facts showed that the
nonconforming use was established almost entirely by tenants and a gratui-
tous licensee or permittee's predecessor in title. The zoning ordinance pro-
vision concerning nonconforming uses expressly recognized and allowed
nonconforming uses to continue. The lower court's conclusion that the
erection of the building for the trucking terminal was a natural growth and
expansion of a nonconforming use was held to be justified by the evidence.
FRANKLIN E. POORE, III
50. 404 Pa. 406, 172 A.2d 320 (1961).
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